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Institutions, the Rise of Commerce, and the Persistence of Laws: 
Interest Restrictions in Islam & Christianity* 
 
 
Jared Rubin 
California State University, Fullerton 
 
Abstract 
 
Why was economic development retarded in the Middle East relative to Western Europe, despite 
the Middle East being far ahead for centuries after the fall of Rome? A theoretical model inspired 
and substantiated by the history of interest restrictions suggests that this outcome emanates in 
part from the greater degree to which early Islamic political authorities derived legitimacy from 
religious authorities relative to those in Europe. This entailed a feedback mechanism in Europe 
in which the rise of commerce led to the secular (and eventually religious) relaxation of interest 
restrictions while also diminishing the Church’s ability to legitimize political authorities. These 
interactions did not occur in the Islamic world despite equally amenable economic conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past few decades, a significant amount of research has been conducted in search 
of the causes underlying the “rise of the West” (North and Thomas 1973; Jones 1981; Diamond 
1997; Landes 1998; Pomeranz 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Greif 2006; Clark 
2007). In relation to the Middle East, such research takes on a special significance. By almost 
any account, the Middle East was far more advanced economically and scientifically than 
Western Europe as late as the thirteenth century, yet Middle Eastern economies did not develop 
nearly as rapidly as Western European ones did in the ensuing centuries and were far surpassed 
economically after the Industrial Revolution (Ibn Khaldun 1379/1958; Mokyr 1990; Kuran 1997; 
Lewis 2002).1 Perhaps instead of searching for the factors underlying the rise of the West, the 
correct question to pose is the converse one Bernard Lewis (2002) suggests: "What went 
wrong?" 
Until recently, popular explanations for the economic divergence, especially those 
espoused by Max Weber, suggested that the "conservative" or "mystical" nature of Islam 
discouraged curiosity (to learn non-Muslim languages or European cartography, take foreign 
expeditions, adopt foreign methods and techniques, and so forth) and prevented risk-taking, 
innovation, and mechanization (Weber [1922] 1978; Cromer 1908; von Grunebaum 1966; Lewis 
1982, 2002). In this view, Islam is seen as inherently hostile to commerce and finance.2 Indeed, 
there are numerous historical phenomena which, on the surface, encouraged this line of analysis. 
In particular, both religions advocated several laws which inhibited economic development – 
                                                            
1 Throughout this paper, I use the terms "Christian world" and "Western Europe" to denote the pre-Reformation 
Christianized regions under the Church of Rome. I use the term "Islamic/Muslim world" somewhat broadly, 
comprising North Africa and the "Middle East" (that is, the entire Arab world, Iran, Turkey, the Balkan Peninsula, 
and Spain up to the Reconquista). Muslim regions of Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Malay Peninsula 
are not the direct focus of this paper, though the arguments are applicable to these regions. 
2 For an overview of this literature, see Kuran (1997, p. 49-53). 
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such as regulations on taking interest and printing, suppression of women, and laws discouraging 
mass education. Although such laws were equilibrium outcomes in the pre-modern settings in 
which they emerged, they generally persisted for longer in Islam than in Christianity despite 
changing circumstances under which they inhibited economic activity. 
Several theories have recently emerged that shed light on these divergent outcomes. 
Kuran (1995, 1997) suggests that social pressures in the Islamic world encouraged individuals to 
falsify their preferences. In this view, European financial instruments and organizational forms 
that were known to Muslims could not be discussed and certainly not adopted. Greif (1994) 
contends that cultural differences – Christian "individualism" versus Islamic "collectivism" – led 
to the emergence of different institutional forms in which contract enforcement and coordination 
based on legal, political, and economic organizations prevailed in Europe instead of the small-
group sanctions seen in the Islamic world. Ekelund, Hébert, and Tollison (1989) and Ekelund et 
al. (1996) suggest that monetary incentives drove the medieval Church’s actions. Though they 
are not concerned with the Islamic world per se, their argument can easily be extended to suggest 
that differing monetary incentives led to differential relaxation of religious laws in the two 
regions.3  
Devoid of any historical context, any of these differences may have entailed that 
economically inhibitive laws were more likely to persist in the Islamic world than in Western 
Christendom. Yet, if any of these hypotheses could be considered the driving force behind the 
divergence in economically inhibitive laws, they must be able to account for one of the most 
ubiquitous of such laws – restrictions on taking interest (usury) on loans.4 Such restrictions 
                                                            
3 See Rubin (2008) for an extended discussion of other hypotheses that could explain the divergence in economic 
outcomes in the Christian and Islamic worlds.  
4 Though the terms interest and usury have different meanings in their modern context, in pre-modern times they 
were largely synonymous, and will thus be used interchangeably throughout the paper (Divine 1959; Persky 2007).  
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prevailed in both religions throughout the medieval period and had an immense impact on the 
institutional structure and the types of financial instruments employed in both regions (de Roover 
1948; Noonan 1957; Kuran 1986; Munro 2003, 2008; Rubin 2010; Koyama 2010).5 However, 
there are numerous phenomena associated with interest regulations for which these and other 
proposed hypotheses cannot account. For example, why were Islamic interest restrictions 
initially more relaxed than Christian ones, but Islamic restrictions persisted while Christian 
restrictions eroded? Why did the Christian Church maintain its interest prohibition for centuries 
after commerce re-emerged in Western Europe? 
This paper suggests an alternative solution which can account for numerous aspects of 
Islamic and Christian interest histories. I argue that the differential persistence of economically 
inhibitive laws in general, and interest restrictions in particular, resulted from the greater degree 
to which early Islamic political authorities depended on conforming to the dictates of religious 
authorities for legitimacy. Religious legitimization has historically been extremely important for 
political authorities in both religions, permitting them to extract more from the populace, 
discouraging revolt, and enabling access to property rights assignment (Mann 1986; Greif 2002, 
2006).6 Although the degree of dependence on religious legitimization is endogenous over time, 
I argue that the initial differences between the Islamic and Christian worlds were an exogenous 
remnant of the circumstances surrounding each religion’s birth. The unintended, endogenous 
consequences of this exogenous difference on equilibrium outcomes are thus amenable to a 
theoretical analysis which falls into a broader literature seeking exogenous roots of institutional 
                                                            
5 On the other hand, many scholars have argued that because interest restrictions were easily evaded, they ‘belong 
less to economic history than to the history of ideas’ (quoted in Kindleberger 1980, also see Labib 1969; Rodinson 
1973; Udovitch 1975; Le Goff 1979; Jones 1988; Pamuk 2004). 
6 For more on the role that religious authorities have played in legitimizing the state in the Islamic and Christian 
worlds, see Mann (1986), Tierney (1988), Greif (2002, 2006), Coşgel and Miceli (2009), Coşgel, Miceli, and 
Ahmed (2009), and Coşgel, Miceli, and Rubin (2010). 
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and economic differences (Diamond 1997; Kuran 2001, 2003, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). 
Moreover, unlike works directly connecting religious beliefs (Weber [1905] 2002; 
Tawney [1926] 1954; Barro and McCleary 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003) or 
religious education (Becker and Woessmann 2008, 2009; Botticini and Eckstein 2005, 2007; 
Meyersson 2009; Chaudhary and Rubin 2010) to economic outcomes, this paper seeks an 
institutional pathway connecting initial, exogenous religious institutional structures to 
differences in economic development. In turn, it provides a connection between Islam and 
underdevelopment that does not rely on any feature of religion itself.7 
In order to shed light on the unintended consequences of these exogenous institutional 
differences, I construct a theoretical model containing three salient features: 1) the existence of a 
productive action (such as lending at interest) which is regulated by political and religious 
authorities, 2) political authorities are dependent on religious authorities for legitimacy, and 3) 
the degree of this dependence is endogenously determined, although the initial level is 
exogenous. The model does not attempt to explain why the initial institutional differences 
emerged, as they are viewed as exogenously given. Instead, the model analyzes how an 
exogenous increase in the returns to production (such as the emergence of capitalistic markets 
allowing for investment lending) endogenously affects the interactions between political and 
religious authorities under varying degrees of exogenous “initial” dependence. That is, it shows 
how both religious laws and the endogenous degree of dependence are in part determined by 
exogenous initial conditions (the initial degree of dependence). 
                                                            
7 This paper thus provides an alternative explanation for findings of cross-country regressions connecting religion, 
and especially Islam, to economic development (Grier 1997; Barro and McCleary 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales 2003). For a different view, see Noland (2005). 
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I show that when the initial level of dependence is large, institutions which support 
economically inhibitive laws are more likely to be self-enforcing. The intuition underlying this 
result begins with political authorities in “low-dependence” economies having greater incentive 
to relax regulations on productive actions that are highly regulated by religious authorities. In 
these economies, the religious authority also has greater incentive to relax its regulation, as it 
stands to lose influence or funding from the political authority otherwise. Moreover, since the 
religious authority reinterprets its supposedly “eternal doctrine”, the legitimizing relationship is 
undermined to a greater extent, resulting in an endogenous change of dependence. 
The model also helps explain other, counter-intuitive aspects of interest history. For one, 
it provides a rationale for why the Christian Church maintained an interest ban for centuries after 
the onset of the Commercial Revolution, only to relax laws in the 14th-15th centuries. It suggests 
that the Church relaxed laws only after its legitimizing relationship with political authorities was 
endogenously undermined over time by the rise of commerce. Moreover, the model also helps 
explain why Islamic interest restrictions were initially more relaxed but eventually stricter than 
Christian regulations. It suggests that early commercial pressures encouraged Islamic 
reinterpretation of interest doctrine, but because of the high level of dependence, the restrictions 
were not fully alleviated and the subsequent levels of dependence were not endogenously 
undermined. On the other hand, the relatively low levels of initial dependence in Christianity 
meant that once commerce was reborn in Europe, endogenous processes commenced which 
eventually undermined both religious interest restrictions and the legitimizing relationship 
between political and religious authorities.   
Finally, the model has implications that extend well beyond the history of interest 
restrictions. Most importantly, it provides a distinction between observed conservatism, which is 
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an outcome, and inherent conservatism, which is part of the preference set. It provides testable 
predictions which show that conservative outcomes may emerge not from a preference for 
conservatism or an inherent resistance to change (as was the preferred explanation of the 
Weberian school), but instead from the legitimizing relationship between political and religious 
authorities. In turn, the analysis of this relationship sheds a new light on why the ingenuity 
associated with early Islamic legal doctrine ultimately stagnated. 
 
2. Interest Restrictions in Islam and Christianity 
2.1. Interest Restrictions in Western Christianity 
The Church’s ban on taking interest emerged in the fourth century C.E. and officially 
became doctrine in 325 when it was included in Canon 17 of the first Ecumenical Council 
(Nicæa). The ban was supported by subsequent Church councils, establishing the basis for the 
“campaign against usury” in the medieval period. 
With European commerce stagnating and most loans being taken for consumption prior 
to the tenth century, there was little need for the Church to re-consider its interest prohibition. 
When commerce revived, however, investment lending became more important – as Robert S. 
Lopez (1971, p. 72) notes, “unstinting credit was the great lubricant of the Commercial 
Revolution.” Yet, in this period the Church actually maintained the interest ban, issuing decrees 
at the Second, Third, and Fourth Lateran Councils (1139, 1179, and 1215) which proscribed 
excommunication for usurers, refused usurers burial in Christian grounds, and interdicted 
usurers' offerings (Le Goff 1979; Munro 2003, 2008). In 1234, Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) 
issued his Decretales, which forever classed usurers as infames (making them ineligible to hold 
public office, honors, or to testify in court), commanded princes to expel usurers from their 
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realms, forbade landlords from renting property to usurers, and invalidated the wills and 
testaments of usurers (Munro 2003, 2008). Throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the 
Church’s “campaign against usury” crystallized into a staunch prohibition in any form, and the 
money-lender was linked with the worst type of evil-doers.  
Despite these condemnations, a growing number of secular authorities permitted 
moderate interest in the thirteenth century, setting laws that merely capped the legal interest 
rate.8 Several rulers at least partially promulgated these laws for personal reasons – there are 
many accounts of rulers needing access to credit, which was often obtained through forced loans 
(Munro 2003). Such loans, which were also known in Venice, Genoa and Florence since the 
thirteenth century, were uncontestable and received relatively small interest (Lane 1966, ch. 6; 
Mueller 1997, ch. 10-14). Larger loans made by entrepreneurs (which were also often forced) to 
secular authorities were risky and default was common, and this was reflected in the interest rate 
they received. 
From the twelfth century forward, the Church explicitly prohibited manifest usury, or 
low-risk credit extended on collateral. This prohibition applied primarily to pawn-brokers and 
lombards (who lent for consumption) and was generally not imposed on the merchant-bankers 
who dealt in financial instruments with non-guaranteed interest. This left the door open for 
religious authorities to permit (through theoretical manipulation) commercial practices which 
were in spirit similar to lending at interest but were not riskless and hence not considered 
manifest usury. Early alternatives to guaranteed loans at interest included partnerships (societas 
or commenda) and the census (or rente), an annuity on a fruitful good which often funded public 
finance. These contracts had features implicit in interest-bearing loans and grew deeply 
                                                            
8 In different locales, different types of legal systems were employed to uphold such laws. Mercantile law was 
especially important in facilitating contracts which either implicitly or explicitly included a title to interest. See 
Berman (1983, ch. 11). For a sample of such laws, see Rubin (2010). 
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embedded in commercial relations. They were eventually justified by religious authorities in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as legitimate within the context of Christian thought, centuries 
after they were permitted by secular authorities (Noonan 1957, ch. 6-7).9 Likewise, bills of 
exchange incited controversy amongst the Scholastics (religious scholars). Bankers used the bills 
to make low-risk profit by taking advantage of differences in exchange rates across regions (de 
Roover 1963). However, religious authorities were willing to accept their validity in the fifteenth 
century, centuries after their secular legality was assured and they became entrenched in 
European finance (Noonan 1957). 
Closer substitutes to interest-bearing loans emerged in subsequent centuries, including 
the triple contract,10 mortgage, and fictitious sales. These contractual forms were eventually 
justified by Christian religious authorities, often by resolving them into other, lawful contracts 
(Noonan 1957; Divine 1959; Gilchrist 1969).11 A final blow to anti-usury doctrine occurred at 
Lateran V (1512-17), when the Church officially sanctioned the monte di pietà, or pious pawn 
bank. The ban was officially lifted in a series of decisions between 1822 and 1836 (though it had 
long been a dead letter) in which the Holy Office publicly declared moderate interest legal to 
everyone. In 1917 the Church offered the Codex iuris canonici, which replaced all earlier 
collections of canon law and allowed a legal title to interest (Noonan 1957).  
2.2. Interest Restrictions in Islam 
                                                            
9 The first arguments by Church authorities favoring the societas appear in 1270, but the broader relaxation of 
restrictions on partnerships arose in the following centuries (Noonan 1957). Innocent IV declared rentes legitimate 
in 1251, but this issue was hotly debated and not fully resolved for two more centuries (Munro 2008). 
10 The triple contract was made up of three different types of transactions: a contract of partnership (societas), 
insurance on the principal of the partnership, and a contract where an uncertain future gain is sold for a lesser certain 
gain. Each individual contract was valid, but when combined, simulated a risk-free loan. 
11 The scholastics permitted these practices by appealing to theoretical concepts such as lucrum cessans (literally 
"profit ceasing", a pre-Smithian term for the opportunity cost of lent money), damnum emergens (loss occurring due 
to not having lent money), and interesse (originally a penalty paid for late repayment), all of which quickly gained 
currency in theological circles and presaged the Church's official relaxation of the ban (Noonan 1957, ch. 5, 12).  
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The prohibition of interest (ribā) has always been a cornerstone of Islamic doctrine. The 
Qur'ān contains numerous injunctions forbidding ribā, which in pre-Islamic times was a usurious 
process in which the principal sum was doubled and re-doubled (Rahman 1964; Schacht 1995). 
In the early Islamic period, commerce thrived to a much greater extent than in Europe, 
and lenders frequently employed straight-forward devices (hiyal) designed to facilitate evasions 
of the ban (Khan 1929; Schacht 1964, 2006; Coulson 1969; Grice-Hutchinson 1978; Ray 1997). 
Most of these devices were not only permitted by religious authorities but were also created by 
them. A famous example of a hiyal is the double sale (mukhātara), in which the prospective 
debtor sells to a creditor some commodity for cash, then immediately buys it back for a greater 
sum payable at a later date. This essentially amounts to a loan at interest, with the interest being 
the difference between the two prices. This simple stratagem was known in Medina as early as 
the eighth century. 
Documentary evidence reveals that transactions involving overt, guaranteed interest were 
not a common means of extending commercial credit in early and medieval Islam (Udovitch 
1979). In a detailed study of the early twelfth-century Cairo Geniza, Goitein (1967, p. 170) 
observes that although credit and commerce flourished in Egypt, "even a cursory examination of 
the Geniza material reveals that lending money for interest was not only shunned religiously, but 
was also of limited significance economically ... therefore, the economic role of financial 
investment today was then fulfilled by various forms of partnerships."12 By the mid-twelfth 
century, contracts stipulating interest can be found, but they were either derived from another 
type of contract or concealed in another way (Goitein 1967). Illicit transactions could be brought 
                                                            
12 Partnerships, which were the most common form of credit extension and were widespread within the first few 
Islamic centuries, most frequently took the form of mudāraba (sleeping partnership) or ‘inān, in which both partners 
invested some capital (Goitein 1967; Labib 1969; Udovitch 1970). For an extended analysis of partnerships in the 
medieval Islamic world, see Udovitch (1970). 
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to court where they were generally voided without further legal consequence (Gerber 1999, p. 
129, 141). 
Under the Ottomans, more straight-forward interest-bearing lending was permitted. For 
example, the Ottoman muftī Ebu’s-su’ud (c. 1490-1574) permitted lending at moderate interest 
(though charging greater than 15 percent was considered a criminal offense) under the 
euphemistic designations “transaction” or “legal transaction” (Imber 1997, p. 146). Jennings 
(1973) shows convincing evidence, in a study of seventeenth-century judicial records in 
Anatolian Kayseri, that interest was regularly charged on credit in accordance with the Islamic 
law and “secular” law (kanun) and with the consent and approval of the judge’s (kādī) court, the 
religious scholars (‘ulamā’), and the sultān. These records indicate that 20% per annum was 
considered acceptable and in accordance with the sharī'a. Almost all interest-bearing 
transactions Jennings observes involved some sort of ruse, the most popular of which was 
istiğlal, which involved the debtor giving his creditor a piece of real estate, supposedly as a sale, 
but actually as a pawn (Gerber 1988, ch. 7). It is unlikely that most lenders actually resorted to 
such tricks, however. Indeed, many scholarly works indicate that lip-service paid to sharī'a 
prevailed throughout the Ottoman Empire.13 
Yet, the interest ban has never been fully alleviated in Islam. Direct breaching of the 
interest prohibition has always been considered a deadly sin and remains so in modern times, 
even if, as a practical matter, interest has been de facto legal for centuries.  
 
                                                            
13 Imber (1997) argues that the fact that waqf trustees required borrowers to deposit a pledge suggests that they lent 
at interest directly. Likewise, Çizakça (1995) shows that the instruments used by the cash waqfs in Bursa were 
approved by the courts, but their relatively constant returns suggest that economic interest prevailed. Gerber (1988, 
ch. 7) shows that interest ranging between 10 to 15 percent was considered legal in seventeenth-century Bursa, but 
such transactions were primarily conducted via ruses (mainly istiğlal). Other common ruses, such as the "wool-sale" 
(where a piece of wool is purchased with the price being an interest payment) and resale with a stated profit 
(murabaha), attest that transactions conformed with the letter of the law in this period, even though interest-bearing 
lending was de facto legitimate. 
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3. A Hypothesis: Legitimacy and Institutions 
Is it possible to account for differences in interest histories both between Islam and 
Christianity and within both religions over time? Though I do not claim that a mono-causal 
explanation exists for such complex phenomena, these histories provide numerous facts that any 
convincing hypothesis must account for. For example, why did the Church initially react to the 
onset of the Commercial Revolution by maintaining interest restrictions, only to relax these 
restrictions a few centuries later? Why were interest restrictions relaxed in the Ottoman Empire? 
Why were interest restrictions initially stronger in Christianity, but eventually stricter in Islam? 
Most importantly, why did interest restrictions dissipate in Christianity but not in Islam? 
I suggest that the histories of economically inhibitive religious laws in general and 
interest history in particular can be explained by differences in the degree to which political 
authorities depended on religious authorities for legitimacy. In both regions, religious 
legitimization has historically been extremely important to political authorities, as it created an 
environment in which individuals believed in the content of the espoused rules as well as their 
efficacy in regulating economic exchange (Greif 2006). Legitimacy permitted secular rulers to 
extract more from the populace (though it also allowed religious authorities to extract from the 
rulers), discouraged revolt by both citizens and rivals to the throne, and increased the ruler’s 
ability to assign property rights (Mann 1986; Greif 2002, 2006). 
Although the degree of dependence over time is a function of the political and religious 
authorities’ interactions with each other and is thus endogenous (and is modeled as such), I argue 
that the initial level of dependence stems from the birth of these religions and is thus exogenous 
to the specific doctrines in question. Early Christians were forced to live under Roman authority, 
where it was both unnecessary and infeasible to create a legal system based on religious 
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principles, and early Church leaders advocated a separation between political and religious 
institutions (Mann 1986, ch. 10; Tierney 1988; Feldman 1997). The most famous support for this 
position is attributed to Jesus: “Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God 
the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21). 
On the other hand, Islam was formed at a time of weak centralized power and tribal 
feuding in the Middle East. The response of the earliest Muslim caliphs to rival claims of power 
was to establish a system of “descendent-based legitimacy”, which supported the Caliph’s claim 
to rule via a blood relationship with Muhammad (Greif 2002). Later Muslim rulers (after the 
Umayyads) could not reasonably claim a blood-line to the Prophet, but this early history entailed 
a situation in which Islamic leaders could legitimize their rule by obeying Islamic dictates, or 
what Greif (2002) calls “faith-based legitimacy”. Hence, early Muslim history led to Islamic 
ideals becoming those of the state, and there has never been a clear demarcation in the Islamic 
world between religious and legal authority like there was for much of Christian history (Lewis 
1974, 1993, 1995; Kuran 2005). The exogeneity of these initial differences is argued forcefully 
by Tierney (1988, p. 7), who suggests that 
…as a society grows from primitive tribalism into an ordered civilization, a 
common religion permeates all its activities and helps to form its characteristic 
institutions. The rise of medieval Islam provides a typical example. In such 
circumstances the creation of political institutions quite separate from the 
organization of the accepted religion seems hardly conceivable. Christianity, on 
the other hand, irrupted into an ancient civilization that already had its own 
established hierarchy of government and its own sophisticated tradition of 
political thought based on non-Christian concepts. In the early centuries, 
therefore, the Christian church had to develop its own structure of governing 
offices, sometimes parallel to but always apart from those of the secular 
hierarchy. 
 
This is not to imply that Christian rulers were never dependent on religious rulers for 
legitimacy or that Christian doctrine is not conducive to encouraging a legitimizing relationship. 
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Indeed, early pre-Christian Jewish leaders ruled at the behest of religious authorities, and the 
papacy had a significant degree of power over lay rulers between the eleventh and thirteenth 
centuries. I merely suggest that initial differences in the circumstances surrounding the births of 
the religions led to differences, however small, that fundamentally affected the future 
relationship between political and religious authorities in the two regions.  
But can this institutional difference account for all of the peculiarities of interest history? 
Although it does not directly contradict any of the facts, it does not obviously account for some 
of them. In order to explore this possibility, I build a theoretical model which captures the salient 
institutional elements of both religions and analyzes how changes in these elements, particularly 
the degree to which political authorities are legitimized by religious authorities, affect 
equilibrium actions and the sustainability of economically inhibitive religious laws. The model is 
not intended to shed light on why these initial differences in institutional relationships emerged – 
as argued above, these differences emerged for historical reasons which are exogenous to the 
model. Instead, I analyze the effects of these exogenous differences. 
 
4. Model: Legitimacy, Institutions, and Regulations 
4.1. One-Period Model 
In this section, I model the relationship between political and religious authorities to shed 
light on how their interactions affect secular and religious regulations, such as lending at interest. 
The model analyzes the consequences of exogenous events which affect the socially optimal 
level of regulation bestowed by the authorities. In the context of lending at interest, such an event 
14 
 
could be the emergence of capitalistic markets allowing for investment lending.14 Indeed, Rubin 
(2009), Brenner (1983), and Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) argue that laws banning interest 
were socially optimal in the context of a pre-modern economy with weak social safety nets and 
missing contingent markets. Moreover, Rubin (2009) suggests that the initial promulgation of 
Christian interest restrictions in the fourth century arose due to the self-interest of the Church, 
who acted as a social insurer facing commitment problems (it could not commit to not helping 
those who over-borrowed). However, none of these models explain why interest bans persisted 
in spite of changing economic circumstances, such as the Commercial Revolution, under which 
banning interest (full regulation) was no longer optimal. The present model thus focuses on the 
institutional relationships that determine the extent to which religious regulations are relaxed. It 
generates other, complementary predictions as well, relating to the timing of such religious 
relaxations as well as the conditions under which strict regulations become less severe in the 
long run. 
Part of the explanation for the persistence of religious regulations (and religious laws in 
general) arises from the self-interested resistance of religious authorities to change their doctrine, 
as they derive much of their power from their monopoly on “eternal truths” (Rodinson 1973; 
Noonan 1993, 2005; Hallaq 2001). “Resistance to change” is modeled as a preference, not an 
outcome. One goal of the model is to provide testable predictions related to conservative 
outcomes that distinguish between whether they are rooted in a preference for “resistance to 
change” or other salient features of the relationship between political and religious authorities, 
especially the legitimizing role of religious authorities. To this end, the model employs 
historically motivated behavioral assumptions to generate testable predictions which help explain 
                                                            
14 Another example is restrictions placed on the reproduction of words and images, which may have made sense 
prior to the invention of the printing press, but were clearly restrictive, especially in the Ottoman Empire, after the 
introduction of the press. 
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the differential paths of interest regulations across the two religions as well as within the 
religions over time.  
Consider an economy consisting of two players: a political authority (P) and a religious 
authority (R).15 In Europe, the religious authority can be thought of as the Catholic Church, while 
in the Middle East, the religious authorities can be thought of as local jurisconsultants (muftīs), 
who are the primary source of legal and religious reinterpretation in Islam.16 These players 
interact in a one period game of complete information, choosing political and religious 
interpretations of laws, which can be thought of as the degree of regulation imposed on the 
action in question (such as lending at interest). The political authority chooses a regulation, , to 
maximize its utility, which it derives from two sources: conforming to its intrinsic optima, , and 
conforming to the dictates of the religious authority, . The parameter  can be thought of as the 
legal regulation which maximizes the surplus of the (unmodeled) citizenry. In this case, the tax 
base available to the political authority is decreasing in the distance its regulation is from . 
                                                            
15 I omit the citizenry as a player for the sake of analytical simplicity, although Rubin (2008) considers such a model 
and derives similar results. One potential shortcoming of omitting the citizenry is that the model does not allow for 
coordination between the citizens and political authority or amongst the citizens themselves. This type of 
coordination could encourage political authorities to relax laws, although it would also require that citizens 
coordinate to decrease the importance of religious legitimacy. In any case, it is not clear why this would explain 
differences in the Middle East and Western Europe, as the latter was more individualistic while the former was more 
communal (Greif 1994), and hence one would expect coordination to be more feasible in the Middle East. 
16 It is reasonable to question whether it is appropriate to consider the game played in the Islamic world as one 
between political and religious authorities, since the latter were much more decentralized than in Christianity. Sunni 
Islam crystallized in its first few centuries into four primary schools of law, all separated geographically. Thus, 
much like Church leaders in Christianity, local religious authorities (muftīs and ‘ulamā’) provided dictates –
independent from political authorities (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996; Berkey 2003; Hallaq 2005) – within the 
constraints of their legal tradition. Even though it certainly could have been possible for a rogue muftī to grant an 
opinion not in-line with his legal tradition, it is unlikely that such an opinion would have become part of the 
mainstream (which is of concern in the model), as it would have been quite unlikely to be upheld by ijma’ 
(consensus), one of the four pillars of Islamic legal doctrine. We would expect that due to the decentralized nature of 
Sunni Islamic religious authority, there would be different rulings in areas with different commercial and political 
pressures (as is suggested by the model). Indeed, Rubin (2010) notes that two schools of Sunni Islam (Maliki and 
Shafi’i) explicitly forbade bills of exchange (safatij), fearing that they could be used usuriously, one school 
(Hanbali) permitted them as long as no fee was charged, and they were disapproved of, though permitted, by the 
Hanafi school. Thus, the broad comparative statics of the model should still hold – both across the two religions and 
over time in Islam – since similar institutional relationships and the same corpus of Islamic doctrine are shared in all 
Muslim regions. 
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Thus, the closer the law is to , the more relaxed is the regulation.17 The regulation  is 
continuous, as are all parameters, reflecting the idea that there are many possible degrees of 
regulation. For instance, in the case of interest laws, the political authority may choose to 
prohibit interest, permit interest, or allow interest as long as a sufficiently large transaction cost 
is undertaken (such as hiyal). 
The political authority loses utility when it chooses actions that differ from those chosen 
by the religious authority . The extent to which it loses utility from choosing such 
actions, denoted by , is interpreted as the exogenous degree to which the political 
authority derives legitimacy by conforming to the regulation of the religious authority. In other 
words, we can write the political authority’s utility as: 
                                                    .                      (1) 
The religious authority chooses its regulation, , to maximize its utility, which it derives 
from two sources: conforming to its intrinsic optima, , and conforming to the political 
authority’s law, . The parameter  can be thought of as the religious authority’s initial doctrine. 
This cost associated with diverging from  arises from the historical observation that both 
Christian and Islamic religious authorities have derived much of their power in society from their 
monopoly on “eternal truths” (Rodinson 1973; Noonan 1993, 2005; Hallaq 2001). The extent to 
which the religious authority loses utility from reinterpreting its eternal doctrine, denoted by 
, is interpreted as the degree of the religious authority’s resistance to change. The 
religious authority also loses utility when its level of regulation diverges from that imposed by 
the political authority, , as this decreases the religious authority’s influence with the 
                                                            
17  could be modeled endogenously, where the actions of the (unmodeled) citizenry reveal the potential surplus 
available to the political authority, and the more relaxed the political interpretation is, the more the citizens reveal. I 
have considered such a model in a previous version of this paper (Rubin 2008) and the qualitative results do not 
change when  is endogenous; instead, the results are exacerbated. I leave  as exogenous in the present model 
merely for purposes of analytical simplicity. 
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political authority (Ekelund et al. 1996; Greif 2002).18 The religious authority’s utility can be 
written as: 
                                                    .                      (2) 
I employ the Nash equilibrium concept and denote equilibrium actions with the 
superscript *. Assume without loss of generality that .19 The first order conditions provide 
the following best responses: 
                                                              ,                              (3) 
                                                              .                              (4) 
The Nash equilibrium actions are thus: 
                                                   ,                            (5) 
                                                    .                             (6) 
The model sheds light on how differences in resistance to change ( ), dependence on 
religious authorities for legitimacy ( ), and the surplus maximizing regulation ( ) affect 
equilibrium regulations. In particular, the model shows how religious and political laws change 
when such laws change from being socially optimal ( ) to suboptimal (when  
increases). 
It follows directly from (5) and (6) that 0 and 0. That 
is, political and religious relaxation of regulations should follow the occurrence of exogenous 
shocks that increase the surplus available to the political authority. The intuition underlying these 
                                                            
18 It is also possible that the religious authority is directly affected by setting regulations that differ from the surplus 
maximizing regulation, as this may affect its ability to extract rent from the populace (Duby 1980; Ekelund et al. 
1996). However, adding this concern to the utility function does not affect the qualitative results of the model, as the 
religious authority indirectly receives disutility, through , by choosing regulations which differ from the 
surplus maximizing one. 
19 This entails that . I employ this inequality when taking first order conditions. 
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results is that an increase in the surplus maximizing regulation encourages the political authority 
to relax its regulation, which, in equilibrium, encourages the religious authority to relax its 
regulation. 
Inequalities (7) through (10) indicate that economies with religious authorities more 
resistant to change ( ) and those with political authorities who have greater dependence on 
religious authorities for legitimacy ( ) have less relaxed regulations. The intuition is straight-
forward: a greater resistance to change discourages religious authorities from choosing 
regulations differing from the initial doctrine, which leads to less relaxed political regulations in 
equilibrium. Meanwhile, an increase in dependence encourages political authorities to choose 
regulations closer to religious ones, which are in turn closer to initial doctrine in equilibrium. 
                                                            0,                     (7) 
                                                            0,                     (8) 
                                                            0,                     (9) 
                                                            0,               (10) 
Inequalities (7) through (10) suggest that political and religious authorities in economies 
with greater religious resistance to change as well as those with greater dependence on religious 
authorities for legitimacy impose less relaxed regulations. On the one hand, the model supports 
the hypothesis outlined in the previous section that Islamic political and religious authorities 
ultimately had more conservative (less relaxed) regulations regarding interest due to the 
legitimizing relationship between the two. However, the model is not able to disprove the 
alternative hypothesis that this result emerged because of “inherent conservativeness” in Islam 
( ) – that Islamic authorities merely had a greater preference for resistant to change than 
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Christian authorities. Indeed, the model suggests that the two are observationally equivalent. 
Moreover, there are important historical phenomena for which the model cannot account – for 
example, why were interest restrictions more relaxed in much of the Islamic world relative to 
western Europe for much of their shared history (until the 14th-15th centuries), only to become 
much more relaxed in western Europe? In order to shed light on such questions and differentiate 
between alternative hypotheses, I complicate the model slightly in the following section by 
endogenizing the dependence parameter ( ). 
4.2. Two-Period Model with Endogenous Dependence 
The simplicity of the model presented in the previous section obscures some of the 
nuances that drive the relationship between political and religious authorities. In particular, it 
assumes that the degree to which political authorities depend on religious authorities for 
legitimacy, , is exogenous to the interactions between players.20 Yet, it is possible that part of 
the reason that religious authorities derive utility from conforming to initial doctrine and from 
imposing laws similar to those of political authorities is that doing so also strengthens their 
ability to legitimize political authorities. That is, the legitimacy bestowed by the religious 
authority may be strengthened or undermined by the interactions between the players, and thus 
the dependence parameter, , is endogenous.  
In order to clarify how endogenous legitimacy affects actions and outcomes, I consider a 
two-period model similar to the one-period model analyzed in the previous section, where 
authorities have the same utility functions in each period as they do in equations (1) and (2). The 
level of dependence in period one, , is exogenous, but it is endogenously determined in period 
                                                            
20 There is reason to believe that the resistance to change parameter  could also be endogenous, as conservative 
actions taken in one period may encourage even further conservative actions in the future, especially if other 
arguments are forgotten once they fall out of the mainstream (Kuran 1995). However, adding such a specification 
into the model would only exacerbate the same shortcomings of purely conservative arguments spelled out in the 
present model. 
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two. The level of dependence in period two, , is a function of 1) the exogenous level of 
dependence in the previous period, 2) the degree to which the religious authority reinterprets 
“eternal” doctrine in period one, , and 3) the distance between the political and religious 
authorities’ regulations in period one, . The second factor stems from the historical 
observation that both Christian and Islamic religious authorities have generally derived both 
power as well as the ability to legitimize secular leaders from their monopoly on “eternal truths”. 
When such truths are reinterpreted, the very nature of their authority is threatened (Rodinson 
1973; Noonan 1993, 2005; Ekelund et al. 1996; Hallaq 2001). The third factor underscores the 
notion that religious authority itself is undermined when religious dictates are widely 
transgressed or misaligned with the actions of political authorities. Indeed, this is largely the 
reason why accommodating custom has historically been an open concern of Islamic and 
Christian religious authorities (Schacht 1964, p. 78-85; Noonan 1966, 1993, 2005; Rodinson 
1973; Imber 1997; Libson 1997; Gerber 1999; Hallaq 2001; Zubaida 2003, ch. 1-3). 
In this light, the dependence parameter follows the following path: 
                                               ,              (11) 
where  and  are the relative weights placed on the two sources of legitimacy and 
 is constrained so that 0. 
I assume that religious and political authorities do not consider their second period utility 
when making their first period decisions. In other words, (11) represents the non-internalized 
dynamic costs associated with the religious authority’s actions, whereas its utility function, seen 
in equation (2), represents its internalized, static costs. That is, the difference between  and  is 
that , the inherent resistance to change, is internalized by religious authorities, whereas  
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represents a non-internalized measure of the erosion of legitimizing ability that occurs over time 
as a result of religious authorities “changing” doctrine. 
This specification is chosen in part because it allows for a tractable result but, more 
importantly, because period two can be interpreted as the “very long run”. In fact, if players have 
a sufficiently high discount rate (which would be expected if the actual difference between 
periods one and two were many generations), the results presented here are qualitatively similar 
to a model where players take into account the discounted effect that their actions have on 
legitimacy.21 In reality, it often takes many years for the relationship between political and 
religious authorities to fundamentally change, and the political or religious authority in period 
one will generally be a different individual than in period two. In the terms of Greif and Laitin 
(2004), this means that  is a “quasi-parameter” – one that is exogenous to the players at any 
given point in time but endogenous to the game as a whole. This allows for the study of actions 
where the institutional setting is endogenously changing (slowly) over time. The institutional 
parameters (in this case, ) are viewed by all players as exogenous, yet their actions 
unintentionally undermine or reinforce the very institutional structures which constrain their 
action set. 
This framework employed in the present context explains why the religious authority 
may lose its ability to legitimize despite choosing actions that conform to the political authority. 
This occurs when  is sufficiently large relative to , meaning that the religious authority draws 
its long-run power to legitimize primarily from its hold on eternal truths. Greif (2002) notes, for 
example, that the ability of Islamic religious authorities to legitimize political authorities has 
often been undermined when it appeared that they favored political authorities over Islamic 
                                                            
21 I have formulated an alternative model where players consider their discounted utility when making choices in 
period one and I show that this specification does not alter the comparative statics, though it does provide less 
tractable results. This model is available upon request. 
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doctrine. The religious authority may choose such actions which eventually limit its ability to 
legitimize because it internalizes the static parameters represented in (2) but not the long-run, 
institutional parameters in (11). 
The political and religious authority’s regulations are the same in the first period as they 
were in equations (5) and (6) (replacing  with ). This entails that the equilibrium level of 
dependence in period two is: 
                                                 .                                 (12) 
The Nash equilibrium actions in period two are: 
                                            ,                   (13) 
                                              .                              (14) 
As in the previous section, consider first the effect of a change in the surplus maximizing 
regulation ( ). The model sheds light on how religious and political laws change when such laws 
change from being socially optimal ( ) to suboptimal (when  increases). Unlike 
in the one-period model, changes in the surplus maximizing regulation ( ) affect equilibrium 
actions through two avenues. First, such changes encourage the political authority to relax its 
interpretation because they directly affect the political authority’s utility. Secondly, an increase 
in  negatively affects the legitimacy parameter, as it increases the distance between the religious 
authority’s interpretation and optimal action, , and it increases the equilibrium distance 
between the political and religious regulations, . 
This setup provides testable predictions related to three aspects of the interactions 
between changes in political and religious laws and changes in the economic environment ( ): i) 
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the degree of change of religious laws; ii) the speed and timing of changes in religious laws; iii) 
the “reversal effect”, whereby the one economy has more relaxed religious regulations (higher 
) in the short run but stricter regulations (lower ) in the long run. These three features are 
discussed below. 
4.2.1. The Level of Change in Regulations 
It follows directly from (13) and (14) that an increase in the surplus maximizing 
regulation ( ) results in a relaxation of equilibrium regulation levels. This can be seen in 
inequalities (15) and (16): 
                    1 0,         (15) 
                    1 0.          (16) 
As in the previous section, the model also reveals how changes in resistance to change 
( ) and initial dependence on religious authorities for legitimacy ( ) affect equilibrium levels of 
regulation. The comparative statics relating to the political and religious authority’s choices in 
the first period are the same as they were in equations (7) through (10) (replacing  with ). 
However, endogenizing  provides the following comparative statics in period two: 
                                1 ,                  (17) 
                              1 1 ,                (18) 
                                            1 0,        (19) 
                                            1 0.        (20) 
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Equations (19) and (20) reveal that the degree of relaxation of regulations is decreasing in 
the exogenous initial level of dependence ( ), while equations (17) and (18) indicate that the 
degree of relaxation of regulations is decreasing in the level of resistance to change ( ) when  
is sufficiently large or  is sufficiently small. The intuition underlying these results is straight-
forward: higher levels of initial dependence ( ) encourage political authorities to choose 
regulations closer to religious authority’s regulation, which in turn has two effects. First, it 
directly entails that the equilibrium choice of regulation is closer to initial doctrine ( ). Secondly, 
it provides incentive for the authorities to take first period actions that endogenously undermine 
the second period dependence parameter to a lesser extent. On the other hand, high levels of 
resistance to change ( ) encourage religious authorities to choose regulations closer to initial 
doctrine, which in turn entails that equilibrium political regulations are closer to initial doctrine 
( ). Yet, if  is large, the equilibrium choice of strict regulation has the unintended consequence 
of undermining the religious authority’s ability to legitimize (as  is large in this case), 
and this negative effect on legitimacy can outweigh the direct effect that resistance to change has 
on the equilibrium level of regulation. 
Moreover, inequalities (21) and (22) show that, on the margin, religious and political 
regulations become less relaxed in economies where the initial level of dependence ( ) is high 
after there is a positive change in the surplus maximizing regulation.22 The intuition underlying 
this result is that political authorities with lower levels of dependence on religious authorities are 
more flexible and thus have greater incentive to relax their interpretations. This also has the 
indirect effect of endogenously decreasing second-period legitimacy ( ), which further provides 
incentive for the political authority to relax its regulation. 
                                                            
22 I do not discuss  and  in this section because their signs are ambiguous and these results do not factor in 
the historical analysis. 
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 1 2 1 1 0,   (21) 
 1 2 1 1 0.   (22) 
These inequalities do not suggest that religious authorities implement religious 
restrictions in an ad hoc manner. What they do suggest is that once a restriction (which may have 
been socially optimal at one point in time) is implemented, the flexibility that authorities have to 
relax the laws is a function of the broader institutional structure. Indeed, inequalities (21) and 
(22) merely indicate that higher levels of initial dependence dampen (but do not eliminate) the 
impact of changes in the economic environment ( ) on future policies (  and ). This does not 
mean that high-initial dependence or highly resistant to change economies are forever stuck in a 
“high-regulation” state, but that the level of the shock necessary to push them away from this 
equilibrium is larger.  
In sum, the analysis presented in this section suggests that the following relationship 
exists between the degree of regulatory change and the parameters of the model: 
PREDICTION #1: The degree to which religious and political authorities relax regulatory laws is 
decreasing in the initial level of dependence of political authorities on religious 
authorities for legitimacy as well as the resistance to change of the religious authority.23 
4.2.2. The Timing of Changes in Regulations 
Reconsider equations (15) and (16). Comparing these second period results to the first period 
statics  and  reveals that  and . This is true 
because an increase in the surplus maximizing regulation ( ) affects period two actions through 
                                                            
23 Greater resistance to change does not entail less relaxed laws if  is sufficiently large, as is shown in equations 
(17) and (18). I do not belabor this point because it works in favor of my hypothesis that the relaxation of religious 
laws is tied more to the legitimizing relationship between political and religious authorities than it is to the 
willingness of religious authorities to change. 
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its direct effect on the political authority’s utility as well as through its endogenous effect on 
period two legitimacy, whereas it only affects period one actions through the former.  
This outcome sheds light on the timing of policy change (  and ) following a change 
in . That is, political and religious regulations may not change much in the short run (period 
one) following a change in the surplus maximizing regulation ( ) but may change substantially 
in the long run (period two). Indeed, when resistance to change ( ) or the initial level of 
dependence ( ) are sufficiently large, the regulations of the political and religious authorities 
will not change significantly in period one after a change occurs in the surplus maximizing 
regulation ( ). However, if the “delegitimizing” parameters,  and , are large enough or the 
initial religious doctrine ( ) is sufficiently smaller than , then an increase in the surplus 
maximizing regulation ( ) will lead to significant deregulation (large  and ) in period two. 
This occurs because the change in the surplus maximizing regulation endogenously undermines 
the dependence of the political authority on the religious authority for legitimacy. In other words, 
both authorities may remain adamant in regulating the action for a period of time after an 
exogenous shock increases productivity, but they will begin to relax their interpretation after the 
salient interactions undermine the legitimizing relationship between authorities. As I show in the 
next section, this insight sheds light on lay and religious views on interest in reaction to the 
Commercial Revolution in Europe. 
This provides a prediction that does not arise from the simpler, one-period model. The 
one-period model did not provide a way of differentiating whether resistance to change (a 
preference) or dependence (an institutional feature) is the root cause of observed conservatism 
(an outcome). In this light, equations (15) and (16) provide a testable prediction which only 
arises when legitimacy is the salient force underlying differences in observed outcomes. This is, 
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namely, that religious and political regulations may not be relaxed much in the short run (period 
one) in response to changes in the surplus maximizing level of regulation, but are relaxed 
significantly in the long run (period two). This occurs when the change in the surplus 
maximizing regulation endogenously undermines the ability of the religious authority to 
legitimize the political authority. It is only after the de-legitimizing occurs that the regulations 
are relaxed. 
In sum, a second testable prediction arises from the model: 
PREDICTION #2: After a shock occurs that affects the surplus maximizing level of regulation, 
religious and political regulations may continue to be severe for some time. They will 
only begin to be relaxed after the religious authority’s ability to bestow legitimacy is 
endogenously undermined. 
4.2.3. The “Reversal” Effect 
Finally, the model can also account for the “reversal effect”, which occurs between two different 
economies when a religious authority in one economy is initially more restrictive (low ) than 
the other but becomes less restrictive over time (higher ). To see this, consider two economies, 
I (Islamic) and C (Christian), where all parameters are the same except for initial doctrine ( ) and 
initial dependence ( ). Denote  and  the economy-specific parameters, for , , and 
denote the religious authority’s action . Assume that  and . 
It follows directly from (6) and (10) that if  is sufficiently greater than  relative to 
, then the religious authority in economy I has a more relaxed regulation in period one 
(higher ). This is seen qualitatively in Figure 1, which graphs the religious authorities actions 
in the  plane (where the axes should be interpreted as    and , since  and 
 are placed at the origin). It is straight-forward to show that, given , there is a threshold level 
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of  where any  above the threshold entails that the religious authority in economy I has a 
more relaxed period one regulation. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
However, it is possible that a greater initial level of dependence ( ), combined with a 
more relaxed initial doctrine ( ), may be the very reason why the religious authority in economy 
I has a more restrictive regulation in period 2. This result arises because the second period 
dependence parameter endogenously diminishes by less in economy I. This follows directly from 
(12), and intuitively holds because the religious authority in economy I chooses actions in period 
one which are closer to both the initial doctrine and the political authority’s action – thus 
endogenously undermining legitimacy to a lesser extent. That is, the factors that undermine 
legitimacy are less present in economies with greater levels of initial dependence and more 
relaxed initial doctrine, all else being equal. 
This logic entails that a “reversal” happens in part of the parameter space.24 It is possible 
that the religious authority in economy I has a more relaxed regulation in period one ( ) 
but a less relaxed regulation in period 2. The range over which a reversal arises can be seen in 
Figure 1. In this range, the sufficiently large levels of both  and  entail that the dependence 
parameter in economy I does not endogenously decrease by much relative to the dependence 
parameter in economy C. In economy C, the relatively low levels of  and  mean that the 
religious authority chooses actions in period one which either diverge from initial doctrine or 
from the political authorities’ action (or both), thus endogenously undermining dependence. 
Hence, a “reversal” can occur when the parameters which encourage a stricter regulation in 
period one (namely,  and ) also work to undermine dependence. 
                                                            
24 That a “reversal” happens in part of the parameter space, as shown in Figure 1, is straight-forward to prove. The 
proof has been omitted but is available upon request. 
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The following prediction thus arises: 
PREDICTION #3: A “reversal” can happen between two economies, where the religious authority 
in the economy with a more relaxed initial doctrine ( ) and greater initial dependence 
( ) has a more relaxed regulation in period 1 but a less relaxed regulation in period 2. 
This can only occur if the dependence parameter is endogenously undermined less in this 
economy than it is in the other economy between the two periods. 
 
5. Interest History, Institutions, and Legitimacy in the Context of the Model 
In this section I employ the insights of the model to shed light on numerous aspects of 
interest history and changes in relations between political and religious authorities. I begin by 
discussing how the institutional histories relate to the level of change in interest history 
(Prediction 1) and proceed to analyze the timing of changes (Prediction 2) and the reversal effect 
(Prediction 3). 
5.1. Institutions and the Level of Change in Interest Laws in Islam and Christianity 
A convincing hypothesis must account for two stylized facts noted in section 2 regarding 
the level of change of interest doctrine. These are: i) interest was strictly banned until the 
fourteenth-fifteenth centuries in Christianity, when the Church began to relax interest laws; ii) 
even though interest laws were stricter in early Christianity than in early Islam, interest 
restrictions were never fully alleviated in Islam. 
In the context of the model, the growth of commerce in the late-tenth through thirteenth 
centuries can be viewed as the event which sparked interactions between western European 
political and religious authorities. Prior to this period, loans were primarily taken for 
consumption, and hence usury laws were not necessarily inhibitive (Glaeser and Scheinkman 
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1998; Rubin 2009). Yet, the emergence of capitalistic markets meant that investment lending 
was feasible and that interest restrictions thereby inhibited economic activity. 
Access to credit continued to grow and commercial opportunities became more abundant 
at the height of the Commercial Revolution in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Lopez 1971). 
In terms of the model, this meant that regulations on taking interest were more detrimental to 
economic efficiency (  increased), and secular authorities had greater incentive to legalize 
moderate interest, which they did throughout the continent.25 The model predicts that political 
authorities should have responded by relaxing their regulations in spite of religious 
condemnation. And indeed, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw a flurry of secularly 
approved, but religiously prohibited, innovations of commercial instruments – bills of exchange 
emerged as a commercial instrument of importance at the Champagne fairs, rentes were 
employed for public finance, and the Church-prohibited sea-loan was widely used (Berman 
1983; Munro 2003, 2008). This is precisely what is predicted by inequality (21) – lower levels of 
initial dependence ( ) exacerbate the impact of changes in the economic environment ( ) on 
future policies ( ). 
These events eventually undermined (endogenously) the Church’s authority vis-à-vis 
political authorities, as suggested by the model. Tierney (1988) and Feldman (1997) argue that 
ecclesiastical leaders lost much of their authority over secular rulers in the mid-to-late thirteenth 
century (  decreased) as a result of the growth of secular power into national kingdoms, new 
theories of the state based on Aristotelian foundations, and movements of criticisms within the 
Church. The loss of ecclesiastical power in this period is perhaps best exemplified by the 
                                                            
25 An alternative hypothesis is that secular leaders legalized interest as soon centralized states emerged rather than 
after dependence on religious authorities diminished. While states and secular law were indeed emerging in this 
period (Berman 1983), such a hypothesis would have difficulty explaining why previous secular leaders such as 
Charlemagne denounced interest. 
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Avignon Papacy (1309-1377), where the papal chair was largely under control of the French 
monarch. It was only after this loss of legitimizing power ( ) that the Church began to relax 
interest laws, as noted in section 2.  
In the Islamic world, on the other hand, widespread commercial opportunities arose well 
before they did in Europe (Goitein 1967; Labib 1969; Udovitch 1975). It is thus misleading to 
compare the two regions at any one given point in time – instead, we should focus on the 
consequences of the semi-institutionalized enactment of interest restrictions in the Middle East 
and North Africa upon the adoption of Islam. 
As noted in Section 2, devices for circumventing the interest ban (hiyal) were known 
from the first Islamic centuries. Despite their questionable legality, most hiyal were permitted by 
religious authorities, and many were even created by them. Yet, transactions involving 
guaranteed interest were not a common means of extending commercial credit in early and 
medieval Islam (Udovitch 1979). In terms of the model, early Islamic religious authorities did 
reinterpret doctrine, but their regulations remained restrictive. Why were interpretations initially 
flexible but ultimately stagnant? 
Again, the model focuses our attention on the interactions between political and religious 
authorities. Within the first Islamic century, muftīs (the primary source of legal and religious 
reinterpretation in Islam) and other religious scholars gained considerable power as an 
independent legitimizing force (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996; Berkey 2003; Hallaq 2005). 
In turn, early Islamic leaders, who attained and maintained their right to rule by obeying Islamic 
dictates (Greif 2002), faced significant costs from not complying with Islamic law (  was very 
large). This meant that Muslim political authorities and lenders had little incentive to “push the 
envelope” of what was permissible, and hence overwhelmingly permitted and conducted 
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transactions that could be construed as within the confines of religious law. In turn, such 
transactions were relatively inexpensive for Muslim religious authorities to permit, as they did 
not entail a significant reinterpretation of doctrine. This led to the emergence of an equilibrium in 
which lending at interest was permitted, but only if a sufficient transaction cost (hiyal or other 
cumbersome transaction) was undertaken. In terms of the model, religious regulations were more 
relaxed than the initial ban on interest ( ), but not by much.  
This equilibrium entailed that little endogenous institutional change (related to the 
legitimizing relationship between religious and political authorities) occurred in the Islamic 
world after the first few Muslim centuries. Religious regulations on interest were partially 
relaxed and the exogenous level of initial dependence ( ) was large, so no player had incentive 
to change actions much – and thus endogenously undermine dependence – without the presence 
of a large shock. This does not mean that political authorities faced no challenges, only that 
“faith-based” legitimacy remained extremely important in most Islamic polities and was unlikely 
to be undermined by endogenous factors. 
These histories can now be compared in the context of the model. The high, exogenous 
initial level of (relative) dependence in the Islamic world provided little incentive for changes to 
occur in either interest laws or subsequent (endogenous) levels of dependence. On the other 
hand, the lower, exogenous initial levels of dependence in Christianity encouraged changes on 
both fronts, in turn entailing that interest restrictions persisted for much longer in Islam than in 
Western Christendom (Prediction 1). 
Commercial pressures to relax interest restrictions existed earlier in the Middle East than 
in Western Europe. Hence, the relaxation of interest restrictions happened earlier in the Middle 
East. Yet, due to a higher degree of exogenous initial dependence in the Middle East, interest 
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restrictions were not fully alleviated, and the endogenous processes that eventually undermined 
both Christian interest restrictions and the Church’s ability to legitimize political authorities in 
Europe did not occur in the Islamic world. The model suggests that the endogenous erosion of 
dependence was more likely to happen in Europe, where the initial level of dependence was 
lower. 
Once the dependence of political authorities on religious authorities for legitimacy 
eroded, Christian interest restrictions became relaxed. On the other hand, such an institutional 
change did not occur (at least to that extent) in much of the Islamic world, where interest 
restrictions are still a salient economic feature today. For instance, a significant factor underlying 
the recent rise of Islamic banking is that loans are formed in ways which do not officially 
constitute interest (ribā).26 
These histories provide evidence for the primary prediction of the model: higher degrees 
of exogenous initial dependence of political authorities on religious authorities for legitimacy 
encourage more severe religious regulations of productive actions in the long run. In more 
general terms, exogenous initial differences in institutional arrangements, however small, can 
encourage the relevant players to interact in such a manner that vastly different equilibria emerge 
over time. 
5.2. The Timing of Changes in Interest Laws 
As noted in Section 2, Christian interest restrictions were maintained in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. On the surface, the rationale for this attitude is not obvious – why would the Church 
                                                            
26 Moreover, institutional arrangements similar to those in the Ottoman period still exist today; state muftīs were 
appointed in the twentieth century in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Yemen, and Indonesia, and twentieth 
century constitutions in Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Morocco and Iran (to name a few) include provisions making the 
sharī’a the law of the land (Schacht 1964, p. 107-110; Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996). 
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maintain the prohibition just as access to credit was beginning to lubricate commerce? Does the 
model say anything about the timing of changes in Christian interest restrictions? 
The model provides an explanation that relates the Church’s maintained anti-usury stance 
to its increased legitimizing role.27 In general terms, Prediction 2 suggests that religious 
authorities may initially remain conservative after a positive economic shock such as the 
Commercial Revolution, but they will reinterpret doctrine after the interactions of the relevant 
players endogenously undermine the legitimizing relationship between political and religious 
authorities. That is, religious authorities will continue to strictly regulate the action for some 
time, as they incur a cost from reinterpreting “eternal” doctrine. In fact, the papacy and the 
Scholastics (religious scholars) cited such “eternal” doctrine, synthesized with Aristotelian 
thought, in their efforts to maintain the ban (Noonan 1957; Munro 2003). 
The growth of commerce was at least partially responsible for the endogenous 
undermining of the legitimizing relationship between political and religious authorities, in the 
manner described in the model. Mann (1986) and Greif (2005, 2006, ch. 4, 8, 12) argue that 
national kingdoms emerged due to the growing importance of commerce and medieval cities, not 
the Church.28 Merchants needed pacification between states and in foreign states and hence 
turned to secular leaders to provide such protection in return for loans or taxes. Pacification, in 
turn, fostered urban growth and the further development of trade, which necessitated more 
complex (and usurious) financial instruments. Mann (1986, p. 437) suggests: 
                                                            
27 If anything, papal power increased in this period, but for reasons exogenous to the model. The papacy maintained 
significant power vis-à-vis secular authorities following the Papal Revolution led by Gregory VII in the late eleventh 
century and the resolution of the Investiture Controversy at the Concordat of Worms (1122). Both of these events 
gave the Church immense power until the end of the thirteenth century (that is,  was relatively large) (Berman 
1983; Mann 1986; Tierney 1988; Feldman 1997). 
28 Lopez (1971), Jones (1997), and Greif (2006) similarly argue that the Italian city-states were built by merchants 
for merchants. Though religion was extremely important in the communes, the interests of religious authorities were 
generally subordinate to those of the merchant elite. 
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By the twelfth century, economic growth was generating technical problems 
involving more complex economic relations between strangers to which the 
church was more marginal. The closer relationship between markets, trade, and 
property regulation, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, gave the state 
new resources that it could use to enhance its own power, especially against the 
papacy. 
 
One link made in this paper is that the growth of national kingdoms and commerce was in 
part made possible by widespread secular alleviation of anti-interest dictates. On the one hand, 
employment and secular acceptance of prohibited financial instruments and transactions was 
essential for the commercial growth that preceded the rise of kingdoms and cities.29 On the other 
hand, these events also endogenously undermined the Church’s power over secular authorities. 
These two forces reinforced each other until a new equilibrium emerged – as more profitable 
commercial opportunities became available, merchants further evaded the Church’s dictates and 
sought protection from secular authorities. This provided greater incentive for rulers to provide 
security and legalize interest, as it decreased the importance of religious legitimacy ( ) and 
increased the profitability of credit extension ( ). Hence, the Church’s loss of power vis-à-vis 
secular rulers was itself both a cause and a consequence of the rise of commerce and the 
resulting interactions between merchants, the Church, and political authorities. 
Although the Church initially responded to the Commercial Revolution by maintaining 
its anti-usury stance, this had the unintended consequence of eventually diminishing its ability to 
legitimize political authorities. Prediction 2 suggests that, in turn, the Church should begin to 
relax interest restrictions only after its legitimacy was endogenously undermined. In fact, it was 
only after the importance of the legitimizing relationship eroded in the mid-thirteenth century 
                                                            
29 Conversely, Berman (1983, p. 338) argues that the Church encouraged commerce in this period, noting that the 
Church “encouraged the pursuit of money or riches provided that such pursuit was carried on for certain ends and 
according to certain principles.” This line of thought is not completely contradictory to the argument made in this 
paper, however. I never claim that the Church opposed profit or was even ultimately inflexible in its views on 
interest. Instead, I suggest that this flexibility was only realized after merchants transgressed some of the Church’s 
stricter dictates. 
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that political authorities relaxed their restrictions, and the Church followed suit over the 
subsequent centuries. The “campaign against usury” halted in the late-fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries and the Church slowly began to permit alternatives to interest thereafter. By the end of 
the fifteenth century, religious authorities permitted even more openly usurious practices such as 
bills of exchange and the triple contract. The timing of changes of Christian interest restrictions 
thus accords with the model’s intuition – as secular dependence on the Church endogenously 
diminished in medieval Europe, political and religious authorities relaxed interest restrictions, 
and the institutions supporting the ban were undermined. 
This history also provides evidence in favor of the primacy of legitimizing relationships 
( ) over inherent resistance to change ( ) in the determination of religious and political laws. 
Prediction 2 indicates that when the legitimizing relationship is important, a lag between 
economic shocks (such as the Commercial Revolution) and changes in religious interpretations 
may occur, as the shock leads to interactions which over time undermine the ability of religious 
authorities to legitimize. On the other hand, there is no clear avenue through which an inherent 
resistance to change has the same effect on equilibrium outcomes. Hence, the model provides a 
prediction – supported by the history – whereby institutional features and not conservative 
preferences are shown to be the driving force behind conservative outcomes. 
As explained above, endogenous institutional change like that experienced in Western 
Europe was less likely to occur in the Islamic world, since the initial level of dependence was 
much greater in the latter. Yet, a “natural experiment” which further tests the model occurred 
when exogenous economic and socio-political changes took place in the early Ottoman period. 
The two primary changes were increased demographic heterogeneity (which limited the 
coordinative ability of the masses) and decreased external threats (Coşgel, Miceli, and Ahmed 
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2009). Both of these changes decreased the ruler’s need for legitimacy from religious authorities 
(  decreased, though it was still large), since the threat posed by both internal and external rivals 
was greatly diminished. In turn, the Ottoman sultans brought the religious authority (the muftī 
hierarchy) into the state, a change which enabled a “limited but significant expansion in the 
ruler’s prerogatives in relation to the sharī’a” (Berkey 2003, p. 264). 
These changes provide a further test for the theory, which predicts that a relaxation of 
interest restrictions should follow these events. Indeed, Section 2 notes that interest restrictions 
were significantly relaxed in this period, although lip service paid to the sharī’a was still 
necessary to ensure the legality of the contract. Contracts indicating that interest was considered 
acceptable and in accordance with the sharī'a were common, and it is possible that the actions 
which provided coherence with the sharī'a were never actually carried out. The necessity of 
including some sort of ruse, however, indicates that neither interest regulations nor the 
legitimizing relationship were fully undermined, and indeed, religious authorities remained 
extremely influential vis-à-vis the Ottoman sultans. This history indicates, therefore, that 
exogenous institutional changes that undermined the legitimizing relations between political and 
religious authorities ( ) – but not the inherent resistance to change ( ) – were the driving force 
behind religious relaxations of interest. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that a change in 
the religious authorities’ inherent resistance to change occurred prior to the relaxations of interest 
restrictions. 
5.3. The Reversal Effect 
Finally, the model also sheds light on the fact that Islamic interest restrictions were more 
relaxed than Christian ones until at least the fourteenth century. As noted above, early Islamic 
religious authorities not only permitted evasions of the interest ban (hiyal), but often created the 
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evasions. It can be readily explained why these phenomena occurred centuries before Christian 
relaxation of interest restrictions: there were greater commercial pressures ( ) for change in the 
first few Islamic centuries. Yet, the interest ban was not alleviated in early Islamic history, and 
this created a situation where any future relaxations of Islamic doctrine would have come relative 
to a more “relaxed” doctrine (higher ) than in Christianity. 
Ironically, the model suggests that these early relaxations, combined with a higher degree 
of initial dependence, may have been the cause of subsequent stagnation of interest restrictions. 
Because Islamic religious restrictions were relatively relaxed – and there was a higher level of 
exogenous, initial dependence in these economies – there was less endogenous erosion of the 
legitimizing relationship over time, as religious authorities chose actions closer to both the 
political authorities as well as long-established religious precedent. 
On the other hand, the Christian interest ban remained quite strong through the thirteenth 
century. When the Commercial Revolution commenced in the tenth and eleventh centuries, 
religious authorities maintained the full ban on interest (  was lower (less relaxed) in Christianity 
than in Islam). However, over the course of the next few centuries, the more restrictive 
regulations, along with a lower level of dependence, also encouraged actions between political 
and religious authorities which ultimately undermined dependence. 
As noted in Prediction 3, such a “reversal”, where Christian interest doctrine was initially 
less relaxed but ultimately more relaxed than Islamic interest doctrine, could only occur if the 
dependence relationship is endogenously undermined before the reversal occurs – which is 
shown to be the case. In other words, although the initial interest regulations in Islam were more 
relaxed than in Christianity, the endogenous weakening of the legitimizing relationship between 
political and religious authorities led to a “reversal”. 
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In all, this analysis by no means is meant to indicate that the interactions between 
political and religious authorities in relation to economically inhibitive laws were the sole 
driving force of change in Church-State relations in Europe (and the relative lack of such change 
in much of the Middle East).30 Yet, this history reveals how small exogenous differences in 
institutional arrangements and initial conditions can have immense consequences. It suggests that 
the European Commercial Revolution was in part made possible by the exogenous type of 
relationships between political and religious authorities stemming from the conditions 
surrounding the birth of Christianity – and it was precisely due to these initial conditions that 
religious authorities eventually had to adapt to keep up with economic and political change. This 
is not to say that a Commercial Revolution could not have happened in the Islamic world. As the 
model suggests, these differing institutional structures merely meant that a larger “shock” was 
necessary in the Islamic world to precipitate interactions that could undermine the legitimizing 
power of religious authorities as well as interest restrictions. 
These differences were exacerbated by the fact that institutions do not emerge in 
isolation, but are contingent on historical events, path dependence, and institutional complexes 
(Kuran 2005; Greif 2006). The interactions between the relevant players pushed the institutional 
paths of the Islamic world and Western Christendom in vastly different, self-enforcing 
directions. On the one hand, the interaction between the rise of secular authority and European 
trade networks supported further economic developments such as complex financial instruments, 
impersonal exchange, and the corporate form (Greif 1993, 2000, 2006; Kuran 2005; Rubin 
                                                            
30 Indeed, another important difference between the two religions which is not considered in the model is that the 
pre-Reformation Church was extremely hierarchical while Islamic religious authorities were much more 
decentralized. Yet, this should work in favor of Islam being the less conservative religion, as jurisdictional 
competition would encourage innovation and accommodation of custom. For the same reason, it is more likely that 
Islamic political authorities would be able to bribe religious authorities to relax restrictions, as decentralized Islamic 
authorities had less power to lose by reinterpreting doctrine and much more to gain relative to their wealth. 
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2010). On the other hand, the constraints faced in the Islamic world discouraged such a path – or 
at least, a greater shock was necessary to undermine the political and religious relationship than 
in Christendom. Instead, less economically beneficial institutions and smaller, personal exchange 
networks persisted for centuries in the Islamic world (Goitein 1967; Udovitch 1975; Kuran 2001; 
Greif 2002; Rubin 2010). 
 
6. The Big Picture: Was the “Gate of Ijtihād” Really Closed? 
This paper tackles an important route through which religion directly impacts economic 
outcomes: the perpetuation of laws inhibiting economically productive actions. By refraining 
from attributing anything inherent in religion as the force underlying the economic divergence, 
this framework encourages a reconsideration of traditional notions of conservatism (based on a 
preference for conservatism) in the Islamic world. The most influential of these ideas is that the 
"gate of independent reasoning (ijtihād)” was closed in the tenth century (C.E.). Until recently, 
historians generally agreed that in this period some informal consensus arose that independent 
reasoning, an important method of reinterpretation in the first three Islamic centuries, was no 
longer an acceptable means of finding truth and that henceforth jurists were only allowed to 
follow precedents (Schacht 1964, ch. 10; Coulson 1969; Weiss 1978). Under this theory, juristic 
ingenuity was stifled in Sunni Islam after the founding of the four schools consolidated what had 
been widely dispersed judicial authority. Instead of exercising ijtihād, jurists were confined to 
accepting religious authority (Hallaq 2001, ch. 4). 
Some recent scholarship disputes this notion. Gerber (1999, ch. 4-7) cites myriad cases 
throughout the medieval period where ijtihād was employed. In a study of rulings by the 
seventeenth-century Palestinian muftī Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī, Gerber notes that numerous 
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disagreements which remained unresolved in the classical and post-classical periods arose in al-
Ramlī's time, necessitating a relaxation of devotion to the ancient masters. Likewise, Hallaq 
(1984, 2001) notes in great historical detail that the gate of ijtihād did not close in theory or in 
practice, though its practice became increasingly rare in the medieval period. 
If the gate of ijtihād was not closed, independent reasoning was less frequently practiced 
after the tenth and eleventh centuries. Indeed, Gerber (1999, p. 138) acknowledges that ijtihād 
was not freely permitted in every field, but only in those in which the law remained open. In this 
light, I propose an alternative metaphor: the "gate of ijtihād" may have been closed, but the gate 
was not locked. All that was necessary for the gate to be opened was for political authorities, 
merchants, and other interested parties to attempt to push it open. But, due to the incentives 
supported by the prevailing institutions, few had incentive to “push the gate open”, and observed 
behavior led to the appearance that the gate was closed and locked. The analysis in this paper 
suggests that there was not necessarily a preference-based inherent “resistance to change” that 
facilitated conservative outcomes, but instead these results emanated from the incentives put in 
place by the institutional structure. Indeed, if the gate were not really locked, we might expect to 
see ijtihād in aspects of law which fostered better economic outcomes, such as those studied by 
Gerber and Hallaq. However, the overwhelming cost of pushing the gate open when such 
pressures did not exist was the reason that the gate seemed locked. And once such equilibria 
emerged in the tenth century, beliefs in the gate's closure were supported, further reinforcing the 
relationship between Islamic religious and political authorities. This insight allows us to view 
Islamic legal and economic history through a different lens by looking beyond the scope of 
observed actions to understand the institutions, behaviors, and incentives underlying them. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the role that religious, political, and legal institutions played in 
sustaining and undermining economically inhibitive religious laws in medieval Islam and 
Christianity. I suggest that a salient difference between the two religions’ institutional structures 
is the greater degree to which political authorities were dependent on the dictates of the religious 
authorities for legitimacy in early Islam. To shed light on the consequences of this difference, I 
identify the salient players involved in the reinterpretation of religious doctrine (religious and 
political authorities) and construct a model to identify their interactions under varying 
institutional conditions. I show that when the initial level of dependence is small, political 
authorities have incentive to relax regulations on productivity-enhancing actions (such as lending 
at interest), providing greater incentive for religious authorities to reinterpret “eternal” doctrine – 
even though such reinterpretation endogenously diminishes its ability to bestow legitimacy. The 
opposite is true when the initial level of dependence is large, and the institutions supporting 
regulations on productivity-enhancing actions are self-enforcing. 
The logic underlying these interactions and outcomes helps account for the salient 
features of Islamic and Christian interest histories. Moreover, it potentially sheds new light on a 
variety of historical phenomena in which the interactions between religious institutions and other 
institutions (political, economic, legal, and social) affected economic outcomes, such as the 
differing paths of Islamic and Christian laws concerning printing, slavery, insurance, the 
economic role of women, and education. While significant in their own right, especially given 
the role that unintended consequences can play in institutional and economic development, 
studying such cases within the framework presented in this paper provides insight into a much 
broader economic reality. Contrary to the predilections of many previous scholars, this 
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framework turns purely cultural explanations (based on the “conservative nature” of Islam) of 
the divergence between Western European and Middle Eastern economies on their head. That is, 
while we certainly see conservative, slowly-changing outcomes in the Islamic world, these 
phenomena can be understood as a result of the institutional structures and not as a cause of 
economic stagnation. 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2001). ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, vol. 91(5), pp. 
1369-1401. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2005). ‘The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, 
Institutional Change, and Economic Growth’, American Economic Review, vol. 95(3), pp. 
546-79. 
Barro, R. and McCleary, R.M. (2003). ‘Religion and Economic Growth Across Countries’, 
American Sociological Review, vol. 68(5), pp. 760-81. 
Becker, S.O. and Woessmann, L. (2008). ‘Luther and the Girls: Religious Denomination and the 
Female Education Gap in 19th Century Prussia’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 
110(4), pp. 777-805. 
Becker, S.O. and Woessmann, L. (2009). ‘Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of 
Protestant Economic History’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 124(2), pp. 531-96. 
Berman, H.J. (1983). Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Berkey, J.P. (2003). The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Botticini, M. and Ecksteinm Z. (2005). ‘Jewish Occupational Selection: Education, Restrictions, 
or Minorities?’, Journal of Economic History, vol 65(4), pp. 922-48. 
Botticini, M. and Ecksteinm Z. (2007). ‘From Farmers to Merchants, Conversions and Diaspora: 
Human Capital and Jewish History’, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 
5(5), pp. 885-926. 
Brenner, R. (1983). History - The Human Gamble, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Chaudhary, L. and Rubin, J. (2010). ‘Reading, Writing, and Religion: Explaining Hindu and 
Muslim Literacy Differences in Colonial India’, Working Paper. 
Cipolla, C.M. (1967). Money, Prices, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World: Fifth to 
Seventeenth Century, Gordian Press: New York. 
Clark, G. (2007). A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Coulson, N.J. (1969). Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
44 
 
Coşgel, M., and Miceli, T. (2009). ‘Church and State,’ Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 
37, pp. 402-16.  
Coşgel, M., Miceli, T., and Ahmed, R. (2009). ‘Law, State Power, and Taxation in Islamic 
History’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 71, pp. 704-17. 
Coşgel, M., Miceli, T., Rubin, J. (2010). ‘Guns and Books: Legitimacy, Revolt, and 
Technological Change in the Ottoman Empire,’ Working Paper. 
Cromer, E. (1908). Modern Egypt, vol. 2, London: Macmillan. 
Çizakça, M. (1995). ‘Cash Waqfs of Bursa, 1555-1823’, Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient, vol. 38, pp. 313-54. 
De Roover, R. (1948). Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediæval Bruges, Mediaeval Academy of 
America: Cambridge, MA. 
De Roover, R. (1963). The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank: 1397-1494, W.W. Norton: New 
York. 
Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, New York: Norton. 
Divine, T.F. (1959). Interest: an historical and analytical study in economics and modern ethics, 
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 
Duby, G. (1980). The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Ekelund, R.B., Hébert, R.F. and Tollison, R.D. (1989). ‘An Economic Model of the Medieval 
Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking’, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 
vol. 5(2), pp. 307-31. 
Ekelund, R.B., Hébert, R.F., Tollison, R.D., Anderson, G.M. and Davidson, A.B. (1996). Sacred 
Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Engerman, S.L. and Sokoloff, K.L. (2002). ‘Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of 
Development among New World Economies’, NBER Working Paper No. 9259. 
Feldman, S.M. (1997). Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the 
Separation of Church and State, New York: New York University Press. 
Gelpi, R-M,, Julien-Labruyère, F. (2000). The History of Consumer Credit: Doctrines and 
Practices, St. Martin's: New York. 
Gerber, H. (1988). Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700, Jerusalem: The 
Hebrew University. 
Gerber, H. (1999). Islamic Law and Culture 1600-1840, Leiden: Brill. 
Gilchrist, J. (1969). The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages, Macmillan: London. 
Glaeser, E. and Scheinkman, J. (1998). ‘Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic 
Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 
41(1), pp. 1-36. 
Goitein, S.D. (1967). A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as 
Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, Vol. 1, University of California Press: 
Berkeley. 
Greif, A. (1993). ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Traders' Coalition’, American Economic Review, vol. 83(3), pp. 525-48. 
Greif, A. (1994). ‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical 
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 
102(5), pp. 912-50. 
Greif, A. (2000). ‘The Fundamental Problem of Exchange: A Research Agenda in Historical 
Institutional Analysis’, European Review of Economic History, vol. 4(3), pp. 251-284. 
45 
 
Greif, A. (2002). ‘The Islamic Equilibrium: Legitimacy and Political, Social, and Economic 
Outcomes,’ Working Paper, Stanford University. 
Greif, A. (2005). ‘Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of 
Institutions Supporting Exchange’, in (C. Menard and M.M. Shirley, eds.), Handbook for 
New Institutional Economics, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Greif, A. (2006). Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Greif, A. and Laitin, D.D. (2004). ‘A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change’, American 
Political Science Review, vol. 98(4), pp. 633-52. 
Grice-Hutchinson, M. (1978). Early Economic Thought in Spain, 1177-1740, London: George 
Allen & Unwin. 
Grier, R. (1997). ‘The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross National Study of 
63 Former Colonies’, Kyklos, vol. 50(1), pp. 47-62. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2003). ‘People's opium? Religion and economic 
attitudes’, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 50(1), pp 225-82. 
Hallaq, W.B. (1984). ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, vol. 16(1), pp. 3-41. 
Hallaq, W.B. (2001). Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hallaq, W.B. (2005). The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Helmholz, R.H. (1986). ‘Usury and the Medieval English Church Courts’, Speculum, vol. 61(2), 
pp. 364-80. 
Homer, S. and Sylla, R. (1991). A History of Interest Rates, 3rd edition, New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press. 
Ibn Khaldun. (1379/1958). The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 3 vols. (transl. by F. 
Rosenthal), New York: Pantheon. 
Imber, C. (1997). Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Jennings, R.C. (1973). ‘Loans and Credit in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The 
Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient, vol. 16(2/3), pp. 168-216. 
Jones, E.L. (1981). The European Miracle: Environments, Economics, and Geopolitics in the 
History of Europe and Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jones, E.L. (1988). Growth Recurring: Economic Change in World History, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Jones, P. (1997). The Italian City-State: From Commune to Signoria, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Khan, M.S.A. (1929). ‘The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded’, 
Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, vol. 11, pp. 233-44. 
Kindleberger, C.P. (1980). ‘Review of the dawn of modern banking by the center for medieval 
and renaissance’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88(1), pp. 217–219. 
Koyama, M. (2010). ‘Evading the ‘Taint of Usury’: Complex Contracts and Segmented Capital 
Markets’, Explorations in Economic History, forthcoming 
Kuran, T. (1986). ‘The economic system in contemporary Islamic thought: Interpretation and 
assessment’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 18, pp. 135- 164. 
Kuran, T. (1995). Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference 
Falsification, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
46 
 
Kuran, T. (1997). ‘Islam and underdevelopment: An old puzzle revisited’, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 153(1), pp. 41-71. 
Kuran, T. (2001). ‘The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and 
Limitations of the Waqf System’, Law and Society Review, vol. 35(4), pp. 841-97. 
Kuran, T. (2003). ‘The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic 
Underdevelopment in the Middle East’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 63(2), pp. 
414-46. 
Kuran, T. (2005). ‘The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence’, 
The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 53, pp. 785-834.  
Labib, S.Y. (1969). ‘Capitalism in Medieval Islam’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 29, pp. 
79-96. 
Landes, D.S. (1998). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So 
Poor, New York: W.W. Norton. 
Lane, F.C. (1966). Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane, Johns 
Hopkins Press: Baltimore. 
Le Goff, J. (1979). ‘The Usurer and Purgatory’, in (Center for Medieval and Renaissance 
Studies, eds.), The Dawn of Modern Banking, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Le Goff, J. (1988). Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages, 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Lewis, B. (1974). Islam: From the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Lewis, B. (1982). The Muslim Discovery of Europe, New York: Norton. 
Lewis, B. (1993). Islam and the West, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, B. (1995). The Middle East, New York: Scribner. 
Lewis, B. (2002). What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle 
East, New York: HarperCollins. 
Libson, G. (1997). ‘On the Development of Custom as a Source of Law in Islamic Law: Al-
rujū'u ilā al-’urfi ahadu al-qawā'idi al'khamsi allatī yatabannā 'alayhā al-fiqhu’, Islamic 
Law and Society, vol. 4(2), pp. 131-55. 
Lopez, R.S. (1971). The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mann, M. (1986). The Sources of Social Power: A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 
1760, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Masud, M.K., Messick, B. and Powers, D.S. (1996). ‘Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal 
Interpretation’, in (M.K. Masud, B. Messick and D.S. Powers, eds.), Islamic Legal 
Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Meyersson, E. (2009). ‘Islamic Rule and the Emancipation of the Poor and Pious’, Working 
Paper. 
Mokyr, J. (1990). The Lever of Riches, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mueller, R. (1997). The Venetian Money Market: Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200-
1500, Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. 
Munro, J. (2003). ‘The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes, and 
Negotiablity’, The International History Review, vol. 25(3), pp. 505-62. 
Munro, J. (2008). ‘The usury doctrine and urban public finances in late-medieval Flanders 
(1220–1550): Rentes (annuities), excise taxes, and income transfers from the poor to the 
rich’, in (S.Cavaciocchi, ed.), La fiscalità nell’economia europea. Secc. XIII–XVIII Fiscal 
47 
 
Systems in the European Economy from the 13th to the 18th Centuries, vol. 39, 
University of Florence Press: Florence. 
Noland, M. (2005). ‘Religion and Economic Performance’. World Development, vol. 33(8), pp. 
1215-32. 
Noonan, J.T. (1957). The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Noonan, J.T. (1966). ‘Authority, usury, and contraception’, Cross Currents, vol. 16(1), pp. 55-
79. 
Noonan, J.T. (1993). ‘Development in Moral Doctrine’, Theological Studies, vol. 54, pp. 662-77. 
Noonan, J.T. (2005). A Church that Can and Cannot Change, Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press. 
North, D.C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W.W. Norton. 
North, D.C. and Thomas, R.P. (1973). The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pamuk, Ş. (2004). ‘Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800’, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 35, pp. 225-47. 
Persky, J. (2007). ‘Retrospectives: From Usury to Interest’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
vol. 21(1), pp. 227-36. 
Pomeranz, K.L. (2000). The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rahman, F. (1964). ‘Ribā and Interest’, Islamic Studies, vol. 3, pp. 1-43. 
Ray, N.D. (1997). ‘The Medieval Islamic System of Credit and Banking: Legal and Historical 
Considerations’, Arab Law Quarterly, vol. 12, pp. 43-90. 
Rodinson, M. (1973). Islam and Capitalism, Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Rubin, J. (2008). ‘Printing and Interest Restrictions in Islam & Christianity: An Economic 
Theory of Inhibitive Law Persistence’, Working paper. 
Rubin, J. (2009). ‘Social Insurance, Commitment, and the Origin of Law: An Economic Theory 
of the Emergence of Interest Bans’, Journal of Law & Economics vol. 52(4), pp. 761-
777.  
Rubin, J. (2010). ‘Bills of Exchange, Interest Bans, and Impersonal Exchange in Islam and 
Christianity’, Explorations in Economic History vol 47(2), pp. 213-227. 
Schacht, J. (1964). An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schacht, J. (1995). ‘Ribā’, in (C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, G. Lecomte, Eds.), 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition, Brill: Leiden. 
Schacht, J. (2006). ‘Hiyal’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam Online Edition, 2nd edition. 
Tawney, R.H. (1926) 1954. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, New York: Mentor. 
Tierney, B. (1988). The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press.  
Udovitch, A.L. (1970). Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton. 
Udovitch, A.L. (1975). ‘Reflections on the Institutions of Credits and Banking in the Medieval 
Islamic Near East’, Studia Islamica, vol. 41, pp. 5-21. 
Udovitch, A.L. (1979). ‘Bankers without Banks: Commerce, Banking, and Society in the Islamic 
World of the Middle Ages’, in (Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, eds.), The 
Dawn of Modern Banking, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 255-273 
von Grunebaum, G.E. (1966). Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
48 
 
Weber, M. (1905) 2002. The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism, New York: Penguin. 
Weber, M. (1922) 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Weiss, B. (1978). ‘Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad’, American Journal of 
Comparative Law, vol. 26, pp. 199-212. 
Zubaida, S. (2003). Law and Power in the Islamic World, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
  
49 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Reversal in Religious Interpretation 
 
rC > rI in both periods
rI > rC in both periods
REVERSAL
rI > rC in period 1
rC > rI in period 2
